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Are pharmaceutical price controls in Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, and Japan responsible for
pushing their drug prices below prices in the United
States? The answer has implications for US trade
policy negotiations, and for the debate about whether
the US government should directly negotiate Medicare
drug prices.
Countries that represent a small portion of overall
drug spending have an incentive to pay low prices for
a given drug, knowing that their share of drug spend-
ing is small enough not to adversely affect incentives
for research and development. If, however, many
countries use price controls, the aggregate harm
for research incentives could be substantial. The US
which accounts for 48% of global pharmaceutical
sales [1], would probably harm research incentives if it
used price controls, so the US might want to pressure
other countries to pay more. Olson and Zeckhauser
described the exploitation of the great by the small
(referring to government military alliances) [2]. In
2003, FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan scolded
other countries for using drug price controls to avoid
paying their “fair share” and “slowing the process of
drug development worldwide” [3].
On the other hand, drug manufacturers are not
helpless when it comes to price controls. Both the buyer
and seller have market power and can walk away from
negotiations. Pharmaceutical companies have fewer
drug launches and longer launch delays in countries
with price controls [4,5]. Governments can walk away
from negotiations and authorize generic drugs prior to
patent expiration, as Thailand did in 2006 and Brazil
did in 2007, citing national health emergencies [6].
Two recent studies provide evidence that drug prices
for novel drugs are comparable across developed coun-
tries. Roughhead et al. compare Australian prices to
several measures of US prices, including Average Sales
Price, Average Wholesale Price, the Federal Supply
Schedule, and the Big 4 Price [7]. Calfee et al. examine
more countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom), but use one measure of price
from IMSHealth MIDAS data [8]. Calfee et al. omit
rebates but point to a Health and Human Services
report suggesting that rebates are small. For the novel
drugs in question, this seems reasonable.
The two studies provide evidence that novel drugs
are not more expensive in the United States, but what
about less unique, i.e., follow-on drugs? Roughhead
et al. do not analyze such drugs [7]. Calfee et al. ﬁnd
that less-unique drugs are relatively more expensive in
the United States [8], but the authors use price data
that do not include rebates which might be important
in the follow-on market. When drugs face branded
competition, they rarely lower their list price, but
instead offer greater rebates to payers. Health insurers
are able to extract rebates from manufactures of
follow-on drugs in exchange for preferable formulary
status. Demand is sensitive to relative copayment, so
drug manufacturers should be willing to pay high
rebates to have low insurance copayments relative to
rivals [9].
It would be interesting to combine the Roughhead
et al. [7] data (Average Sales Price, which includes
rebates, and other US price data) with the Calfee et al.
[8] data (international prices for follow-on drugs in
multiple countries). Average Sales Price data have
rarely been used in research to date, probably because
the data are only available beginning with 2005 and
because the data are not available for all drugs. Nev-
ertheless, several drugs with relatively close substitutes
appear in both ASP data and the Calfee et al. data
including azithromycin, ondansetron, and sumatriptan
[8,10].
Of course, ﬁnding that prices outside the United
States are lower does not necessarily mean that price
controls are responsible. Prices outside the United
States might be lower because of demand-side differ-
ences such as lower average incomes and lower
average prices for medical substitutes, such as surgery.
On the other hand, price controls can be pernicious,
especially when based on low prices in poor countries.
When rich countries base their prices on average or
minimum prices in poorer countries, they create incen-
tives for drug manufacturers to raise prices in poor
countries [11,12].
This commentary began by describing a difference
between large and small markets: large markets cannot
use price controls without the risk of substantially
harming incentives for research and development. On
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the other hand, there are advantages for large markets
that appear after patent expiration. In large markets,
more generic ﬁrms enter, and greater competition drives
down generic prices [13]. Generic pharmaceuticals tend
to be cheaper in the United States than the rest of the
world [14]. Hence, we have evidence that novel drugs
and generic drugs are as cheap or cheaper in the United
States than in other developed countries. It would be
interesting to know more about the variation in global
prices for follow-on branded drugs, after accounting
for rebates paid to US insurers. Additional research
would be valuable for international trade policy and
US government procurement of pharmaceuticals.
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